In a framework with an upstream monopoly and a downstream duopoly, we analyze the impact of convex costs on the downstream level. In constrast to the case of constant marginal costs, vertical integration does not imply complete market foreclosure. While the nonintegrated downstream¯rm receives a strictly positive amount of the intermediate good, the downstream allocation is ine±cient. However, a parametrized example indicates that competition at the downstream level may increase aggregate welfare.
Introduction
Recently, there have been several theoretical papers arguing that vertical integration may have severe anti-competitive e®ects. These papers, sometimes referred to as new foreclosure theories, include Salinger (1988) , Hart and Tirole (1990) , and Ordover et al. (1990) . In rigorous game-theoretic models, the authors reestablish the more hostile view of vertical integration the \naive" foreclosure theories of the 1950s and 1960s had suggested (see Rey and Tirole, 1997) .
1 They thereby challenge the more benign view of vertical restraints which was adopted since the 1980s following the contributions of the Chicago School (see, e.g., Bork, 1978) .
2
Particularly in°uential has been the paper of Hart and Tirole (1990) .
3
The core of their analysis 4 is a commitment problem. Suppose there is an upstream monopolist and two downstream¯rms. Without vertical integration, the monopolist cannot fully exercise its monopoly power because, once terms are¯xed with one downstream¯rm, the contract with the other downstream¯rm will be arranged at the disadvantage of the¯rst¯rm. Since downstream¯rms will anticipate this kind of opportunistic behavior, the upstream monopolist cannot fully exploit its monopoly position. As a consequence, competition at the downstream level increases social welfare. By contrast, if the upstream monopoly is vertically integrated with one of the downstream¯rms, it can foreclose the other¯rm by selling the intermediate Brian and Scha®er (1992) , McAfee and Schwartz (1994) and Rey and Tirole (1997) . Snyder (1995) contains a survey of empirical tests of the models, and Martin, Normann and Snyder (2001) provide experimental evidence. 4 We refer to Hart and Tirole's (1990) ex post monopolization variant.
1 good exclusively to its own downstream¯rm. Assuming constant marginal costs at the downstream level, Hart and Tirole (1990) show that the vertically integrated¯rm completely forecloses the nonintegrated¯rm and restricts output at the monopoly level. Therefore, vertical integration solves the commitment problem. Competition at the downstream level due to the nonintegrated¯rm does not imply any positive welfare e®ects.
It is the purpose of this paper to show that these results crucially depend on the assumption of constant marginal costs at the downstream level.
Assuming convex marginal costs, we show that vertical integration is not su±cient to overcome the commitment problem and that competition at the downstream level can increase social welfare. With convex marginal costs, complete foreclosure of the nonintegrated downstream¯rm implies an ine±cient allocation of the total output. Distributing the quantity among both downstream¯rms increases e±ciency and hence the monopolist's pro¯t.
However, any contract with the nonintegrated downstream¯rm is still subject to the commitment problem. Once a contract is¯xed, the integrated monopolist will set the quantity supplied to its own downstream¯rm at the disadvantage of the nonintegrated downstream¯rm. Hence, vertical integration does not fully solve the commitment problem with convex downstream costs. Competition at the downstream level leads to an increase in the quantity supplied and can increase social welfare as compared to the situation where the upstream monopolist can credibly commit to o®er the monopoly output.
Our results con¯rm the concerns of Rey and Tirole (1997, p.21) and Bork (1978, p.228) about the complete foreclosure result in the literature. Rey and Tirole (1997, p.21) note that the complete exclusion of the noninte-grated¯rm is a \drastic consequence" and that supply of the downstream competitor is \a sometimes realistic scenario." Bork (1978, p.228 integration. This is related to the results of Alexander and Rei®en (1995) who show that exclusive territories and resale price maintenance may in fact not have the commitment power the theoretical literature asserts. Similarly, Rei®en (1992) argues that a vertical merger per se is not su±cient in the model of Ordover et al. (1990) . All this suggest that vertical integration does not imply monopolization without quali¯cation.
In section 2 we introduce our model and specify the¯rms' pro¯t functions in three di®erent scenarios. We¯rst consider nonintegration where an upstream monopolist faces two independent downstream¯rms. In the second scenario, the upstream monopolist is integrated with one of the two downstream¯rms. In the third scenario, the upstream¯rm can credibly commit to o®er any level of output (e.g. through observable or complete contracts).
In section 3, we compare equilibrium outputs for the three scenarios and analyze the impact on pro¯ts, consumers' surplus and welfare. We conclude in section 4.
2 The Model
Consider a market with one upstream¯rm, U; and two downstream¯rms, D i , i = 1; 2; and suppose that downstream¯rms compete in quantities. The q i are¯rms' individual outputs, and Q = q 1 + q 2 is industry output. We make the following assumptions:
A1. The inverse demand function, p(Q); is weakly concave with p 0 (Q) < 0 and p 00 (Q) · 0.
A2. The upstream¯rm has convex costs in production c U (Q) with c The demand and cost functions are public knowledge. As in Hart and Tirole (1990) , we assume that U o®ers take-it-or-leave-it contracts to the downstream¯rms. The contracts have the form (q i ; T i ), where q i is a certain quantity o®ered for a¯xed tari® T i . We will analyze the following three scenarios. First, there is the nonintegrated case (n). Second, there is integration (i) between¯rm U and¯rm D 1 . In the third scenario, U can commit (c).
Nonintegration. In this scenario, the upstream¯rm is not integrated with either of the downstream¯rms. Contracts are not observable, that is, With secret contracts and passive beliefs, downstream¯rm i accepts any contract (q i ; T i ) with T i · ¼ i (q i ;q j ), whereq j with j = 1; 2; i 6 = j denotes the candidate equilibrium quantity of D j and
and
Since (1) must hold for both downstream¯rms, the quantities o®ered in a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium must satisfy the mutual best response property, i.e., they must constitute a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Our above assumptions guarantee that the reaction functions q
are downward sloping with q ¤0 i 2 (¡1; 0): Therefore, a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity solving q n = q ¤ i (q n ) exists. The unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium is given by U o®ering (q n ; T n ) to both downstream¯rms with
Integration. We assume that the integrated¯rm U -D 1 cannot credibly commit to produce a certain quantity q 1 prior to o®ering any contract (q 2 ; T 2 ) to D 2 . To determine the optimal contract we consider two cases. First, D 2 accepts the contract and supplies q 2 . Second, D 2 accepts the contract but supplies a quantity b q 2 smaller than q 2 . In the¯rst case, the optimal quantity
Anticipating q ¤ 1 (q 2 ), D 2 will accept the contract (q 2 ; T 2 ) and will supply q 2 if
holds. Suppose (5) holds. With
Using the envelope theorem, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the optimal quantity q i 2 are
Since q ¤0 1 > ¡1; it follows form (3) and (7) that q
2 and industry output is given by
Turning to the second case, assume that U -D 1 o®ers a contract (q 2 ; T 2 ) such that D 2 accepts the contract but supplies a quantity b q 2 < q 2 . Then, the supplied quantities are characterized by
¼ 2 (e q 2 ; b q 1 (e q 2 ; q 2 )) with b q 2 < q 2 and b q 1 (e q 2 ; q 2 ) = arg max
Comparing the necessary conditions for b q 2 (q 2 ) and b q 1 (e q 2 ; q 2 ) shows that D 2 would supply b q 1 if U -D 1 had o®ered a (accepted) contract with b q 1 instead of q 2 . Furthermore, using (3) reveals q
. Therefore, any contract with q 2 > b q 2 (q 2 ) can not be optimal and the equilibrium is characterized by (q
Commitment. In this scenario, we assume that U can credibly commit to any output level. A simple commitment device are observable contracts (McAfee and Schwartz, 1994) . 8 Observability implies that each downstream rm knows the quantity o®ered to the other¯rm when deciding on accepting its own contract. Hence, in a subgame perfect equilibrium,¯rm i will accept any o®er (q i ; T i ) with T i · ¼ i (q i ; q j ). U will choose T i = ¼ i (q i ; q j ) and the quantities such that total industry pro¯ts
are maximized. Let denote q c the quantity which solves
Convexity and symmetry of the cost functions imply that U o®ers q c to both downstream¯rms D 1 and D 2 : Total industry output is given by Q c := 2q c > Q n .
The Results
We start by analyzing the impact of vertical integration on output.
Proposition 1 With vertical integration, the nonintegrated downstream¯rm receives q i 2 > 0 and the integrated downstream¯rm receives q
Industry output Q i is greater than in the commitment scenario but smaller than in the nonintegration case, i.e., Q i 2 (Q c ; Q n ).
from (10) 
Again using (10), we get (12) where the last inequality follows from p 0 q k 2 q ¤0 1 > 0 and q k 2 < q c : Hence, we get
Using (2), we obtain 
Similarly, W n > W i follows from Q n > Q i where, in addition, production of
To prove W i > W c for linear demand and linear-quadratic costs, assume that p(Q) = 1 ¡ Q and that c U (Q) = 0:5®Q 2 and c(q) = 0:5¯q 2 with ®;¯> 0: 9 It is straightforward to derive q c = 1=(4 + 2® +¯), ¼ c = 1=(4 + 2® +¯), and CS c = 2=(4 + 2® +¯) 2 . Further, q ¤ 1 (q 2 ) = (1 ¡ q 2 (1 + ®))=(2 + ® +¯). Maximizing (6) for this parametrization yields
9 Using p(Q) = a ¡ bQ; c U (Q) = ® 1 Q + 0:5® 2 Q 2 and c(q) =¯1q + 0:5¯2q 2 with all parameters being positive would not change our results. The additional parameters a; b; ® 1 and¯1 would only clutter the analysis.
Note that for ® =¯= 0; the constant marginal (zero) cost equilibrium results: q i 2 = 0 and q ¤ 1 (0) = 0:5. We obtain
Finally, regarding ¢W = W i ¡ W c ; simple but tedious calculation shows 
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze a model of vertical integration allowing for convex cost functions at the downstream level. As a result, the nonintegrated downstream¯rm sells a strictly positive quantity. Since the integrated downstream¯rm receives a larger quantity, the downstream allocation is ine±-cient. However, compared to the scenario in which the upstream¯rm can credibly commit, aggregate output increases. For linear demand and linearquadratic costs, this increase in output is su±cient to more than compensate the e±ciency loss in production. In such cases, welfare increases.
Our results suggest that upstream monopolists, choosing among various vertical contractual arrangements, should actually look for devices which enable to fully commit themselves (e.g. publicly observable contracts) rather than to integrate downwards. In our model, upstream monopolists are only indi®erent between integration and such a commitment device when the downstream industry exhibits constant marginal costs. On a policy level, however, this does by no means imply that vertical integration is harmless.
Though the nonintegrated downstream¯rm is not completely foreclosed when cost functions are convex, there is market foreclosure in the sense of reduced output, compared to the vertically unrestricted market. In addition, there are ine±ciencies in the downstream allocation with integration, so, generally, welfare is reduced.
